ALERTER
All for One and One for All: The Court of Appeal’s Decision in Black Horse v Angel

Download this Alerter by Thomas Samuels, George Mallet, Lia Moses, Reanne MacKenzie, Vishnu Patel & Benn Sheridan

In Black Horse Ltd v Angel & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 831, the Court of Appeal has approved the use of “omnibus” claim forms by a cohort of over 5,000 claimants each pursuing individual unfair relationship claims arising from the non-disclosure of discretionary commission models in connection with motor finance agreements.

Introduction

 In Black Horse Ltd v Angel & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 831 (“Angel”), the Court of Appeal was asked to determine whether the ‘convenience’ test in CPR r.7.3 had been met and whether the claimants should be permitted to use an omnibus claim form to bring their claim.

Omnibus claim forms are one of a number of procedural mechanisms contained within the Civil Procedure Rules by which mass claims can be brought within England and Wales. The use of an omnibus claim form is permitted under r.7.3, which provides that a ‘claimant may use a single claim form to start all claims which can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings.’ Also relevant is r.19.1, which provides that any ‘number of claimants or defendants may be joined as parties to a claim.’ In this way, multiple claimants can jointly seek redress, but only in circumstances where their claims ‘can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings’.

The claimants all brought unfair relationship (“UR”) claims in respect of motor finance agreements under ss.140A-C Consumer Credit Act 1974 (“CCA 1974”) due to the non-disclosure of motor finance commission and the use of discretionary commission arrangements (“DCAs”).

As discussed in this Alerter, ultimately the Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s decision and approved the use of omnibus claim forms by a cohort of over 5,000 claimants. It is likely to encourage consumer litigators and funders away from largely generic individual small claims track cases and towards the use of the omnibus procedure where 100s or 1000s of similar cases can be resolved by means of a single set of proceedings.

Background to the decision

The litigation concerns an underlying fact pattern with which readers of this Alerter will be familiar: an individual consumer purchases a motor vehicle from a car dealer with the assistance of a loan from a third-party lender, in circumstances where it is alleged that , unbeknownst to the consumer, the lender has paid a commission to the car dealer which may not have been adequately disclosed. In some cases, the dealer may also be afforded a discretion by the lender to fix the interest rate on the loan within a prescribed range, according to which, in turn, the dealer’s commission may be increased or decreased. Thus, it is alleged that by reason of the failure to explain the existence and operation of the commission arrangements in place, the consumer was unfairly deprived of the opportunity to take an informed decision on the value proposition offered by the loan and could have obtained a better deal elsewhere.

The question was considered by the Supreme Court in Johnson v FirstRand Bank [2025] UKSC 33. It clarified that, while there was no question of the commission constituting a bribe at common law, there was on the facts of that case merit to an UR claim brought on that basis under s.140B(1)(a) CCA 1974.

The Angel litigation started as far back as 10 November 2022, when more than 5,000 claimants (the “Claimants”) issued claims against eight defendants. Echoing the group litigation procedure under CPR Part 19, each supported their respective claims by reference to a single, generic Particulars of Claim (the “GPoC”). A schedule to the GPoC provided details of each Claimant’s credit agreement(s) and the registration numbers of the vehicle(s) financed.

At the close of pleadings, the Claimants sought directions akin to those which would apply under a group litigation order (“GLO”), namely to facilitate the determination of possible common issues (on which the Court of Appeal expressed scepticism) in the case first, including whether alleged non-disclosure of the commission arrangements, in potential breach of CONC, was unfair in principle (a point which was hotly contested given the fact-sensitive nature of unfair relationship claims).

At the last of a number of case management hearings the court addressed the defendant lenders’ ‘severance issue’. Namely, whether, under CPR 7.3, the Claimants could use a single claim form ‘to start all claims which can be conveniently disposed of in the same proceedings’ or whether individual claim forms were required. The defendant lenders opposed the omnibus approach used by the Claimants on the basis that the question of whether each credit relationship was unfair by reason of non-disclosure was fact-specific. Whether one relationship between claimant and lender was unfair because of the non-disclosure did not have any effect on whether a credit relationship between a different claimant and the same lender was unfair. Thus, the lenders sought disaggregation, or ‘severance’, of each Claimant’s claim.

HHJ Worster agreed with the lenders, holding that the test of convenience under CPR r.7.3 was not satisfied. In particular: (1) he was not satisfied that there were common issues of sufficient significance that their determination would constitute real progress; (2) he was concerned that the ‘superstructure’ proposed for identifying suitable sample cases added to the complexity of the litigation, rather than reduced it; and (3) the ordinary processes of litigation were sufficient, such that a formalised (and aggregated) sampling process was not required. He thus ordered the severance of the claims into individual claim forms, rather than just eight.

The Claimants appealed HHJ Worcester’s decision, relying on Morris & Others v Williams & Co Solicitors [2024] EWCA Civ 376, handed down after the severance hearing, which clarified that the convenience test under CPR 7.3 was broad. At the first appeal ([2025] EWHC 490 (KB)), Ritchie J. allowed the Claimants’ appeal on the strength of Morris. He particularly stressed the existence of broad common issues and the benefits of using test cases to promote settlement. The lenders then appealed further to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal’s decision

In the Court of Appeal Coulson LJ gave the lead judgment. He stated that the term ‘conveniently’ in CPR 7.3 should be given its ordinary meaning. There is no rigid test requiring any of the following in order for an omnibus claim procedure to be used: binding common issues, identical facts, or one final trial. Instead, the court considers what is most practical for the parties and the justice system.

The Court stressed that ‘convenient disposal’ for that purpose includes the court’s ability to use lead cases, disclosure, staged trials and other tools in its case management arsenal under CPR Part 3. It rejected the lenders’ argument that convenience concerns only the operation of the final trial. Efficient management throughout the litigation process is part-and-parcel of the assessment required by CPR r.7.3.

Analysis

This judgment is, following Morris, further encouragement for the use of the omnibus claim procedure at the outset of litigation. There has been increased incidence in the use of multiparty claim forms and collective case management thereafter, including the use of test cases, without the need for a formal GLO. Indeed, arguably in consequence of the greater use of omnibus claims, there has been a decrease in applications for “formal” GLOs[1] . If 1000s of seemingly individual claims of the kind in Angel can meet the threshold in CPR r.7.3, the omnibus procedure becomes all the more attractive compared to (for example) the very high bar imposed by the ‘same interest’ test which applies to representative actions under CPR r.19.8. Angel thus opens the door to an increased use of the mechanism, in particular in the context of low-value consumer claims which would otherwise be litigated individually on the small claims track.

However, an omnibus claim form is still an opt-in mechanism. In this jurisdiction the only opt-out proceedings (at present) are available in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (“CAT”). Even in that context, however, there is an increasing move away from the opt-out proceedings. For example, in Evans v Barclays Bank Plc [2025] UKSC 48 the Court held that the CAT is entitled to conduct a stringent merits analysis in order to certify that opt-out proceedings are appropriate.

Drawing together the threads from both Evans and Angel, there seems to be a clear steer that multi-party proceedings are to be encouraged so long as the court is able to retain proper control over case management to ensure efficiency. Unless and until a consumer class-actions opt-out claims regime is introduced – as to which, see our previous Alerter on the Law Commission’s current proposals – then the real thrust of collective proceedings in England and Wales is likely to be via omnibus claims.

Omnibus claim forms are particularly appealing in multi-claimant consumer actions where each consumer has, at most, a comparatively low loss that may otherwise render their claim uneconomic (for instance, in the data protection context or, now, in the low-value consumer finance context) and indeed may have no loss at all.

Angel is also of notable importance to the consumer finance market. The appellate courts have often stressed that whilst ss.140A-C CCA are deliberately framed in broad terms, each action is fact specific (e.g. Smith v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2024] AC 955, at [17]-[25]). That had resulted in the perception that omnibus claim forms and, perhaps, group actions generally may not be appropriate in unfair relationships claims. Notably, in Abernethy v Barclays Bank UK Plc [2025] EWCC 1 the County Court at Birmingham refused a GLO and ordered the disaggregation of a large volume of PPI UR claims on that basis. As such, Angel may yet usher in a new epoch of multi-party actions in the county court based on the UR provisions of the CCA 1974.

Conclusions

As the Court of Appeal recognised, there has been a ‘vast increase in these types of claims’ (at [140]), which bring a ‘huge increase in workload’ for HMCTS (at [139]). Thus, Coulson LJ noted a review of CPR 7.3 by the Civil Procedure Rules Committee is now ‘back on the radar.’ Pending such review, however, Angel is clear indication that multi-party claim forms or omnibus claim forms are here to stay. As the Court noted, the decision is arguably the ‘tip of an iceberg’ (at [138]).

Nonetheless, those litigating such claims would be well-advised to bear in mind two notes of caution. First, Coulson LJ’s criticisms of the ‘extravagant’ costs that had been incurred by both sides in Angel to achieve ‘almost nothing in its three-and-a-half year lifetime’ (at [9]). Secondly, his concern that, partly by reason of its ‘procedural history’, Angel was an ‘unreliable vehicle for any statement of principle or guidance concerning multi-claimant claims’ (at [11]).

Thomas Samuels
George Mallet
Lia Moses
Reanne MacKenzie
Vishnu Patel
Benn Sheridan

9 July 2026

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